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Of plagues, planes and politics:  
controlling the global spread of infectious diseases by air 
 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the implications of globalisation for the spread of infectious diseases 
has begun to emerge as an area of concern to political geographers. Unsurprisingly, 
much of the contemporary literature focuses on the multifarious threats posed by 
human and, increasingly, non-human mobility. Prompted by current geo-political 
concerns surrounding the public health implications of regular international air travel, 
this paper extends such research by exploring the ways in which the technology of the 
aeroplane stimulated the production of new international sanitary initiatives aimed at 
safeguarding global public health in an era of mass aeromobility. By tracing the 
development of sanitary regulations for aerial navigation, from their origins in the 
1920s through the twentieth century in particular, we document the emergence of a 
series of public health interventions that were designed to limit the public health 
threat associated with increased international air travel and the concomitant rise in the 
mobility of infectious diseases. From inoculation certificates to quarantine and the 
routine ‘disinsection’ of passenger aircraft with powerful insecticides, modern air 
travel is replete with a complex set of procedures designed to lessen the risks 
associated with flying between different climatic and ecological zones. Our detailed 
examination of the historical context in which these procedures were devised and 
implemented leads us to consider the importance of time and space, power and 
efficacy, to the development of a more nuanced understanding of the shifting public 
health response to an increasingly fluid, mobile, and inter-connected society. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Since the first heavier-than-air powered flight in 1903, technological developments 
have enabled aircraft to fly progressively further, faster, longer, and higher, 
overcoming the tyranny of distance and fundamentally reshaping the patterns and 
practices of twentieth and early twenty-first century mobilities. Today, nearly two 
billion passengers a year travel by air and the commercial airline network is routinely 
depicted as being the metaphorical glue that makes the world go round (Adey et al., 
2007; Urry, 2007).  
 
The sheer volume of passenger and freight movements by air combined with, amongst 
other things, the putative ‘mobilities turn’ in the social sciences (see Urry, 2000; 
Cresswell, 2006), has led to a recent surge of academic interest in the multifarious 
dimensions of aviation. Scholars including Bowen (2002), O’Connor (2003), and 
Witlox et al. (2004) have shed light on the unfolding networks of air transportation 
and Gordon (2008), Adey (2008), and others have alerted us to the multiple historical 
and cultural geographies of the airport terminal. However, while much was made of 
aviation’s importance to the administration and maintenance of 20th century imperial 
ambitions, including those of Britain (see Sykes, 1920; Cobham, 1926a; 1926b; 
Hoare, 1927; Salt, 1930), the development of long-haul air routes and the formation of 
sanitary regulations for aviation is one dimension of the imperial experience that has 
received scant academic attention to date. This paper addresses this lacuna by tracing 
what we refer to as the historical ‘bio-geopolitics’ of passenger aviation. 
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THE ‘BIO-GEOPOLITICS’ OF AVIATION 
 
According to Gould (1999), of the near 4000 airports in the world with scheduled 
international passenger services, no two are more than 36 hours flying time apart; 
leading him to conclude that airports are not just nodes in a global space of air traffic 
flows but important transit points for the rapid, worldwide spread of disease. The 
significance of this calculation is, in part, reflected in research which reveals that, in 
an era of unprecedented global aeromobility when hundreds, if not thousands, of 
human pathogens are circulating the world’s airways (Liebhold et al., 2006; Pavia, 
2007), the global airline network plays an important role in the worldwide spread of 
infectious diseases (Mangili and Gendreau, 2005; Colizza et al., 2006; Tatem et al., 
2006; Tatem and Hay, 2007; Avila et al., 2008). The epidemiological vulnerability of 
a closely interconnected and highly aeromobile twenty-first century world was 
illustrated in 2003, when the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) virus 
rapidly spread from East Asia to over 25 countries around the world along the 
contours of the global airline network (Pang and Guindon, 2004; Bowen and Laroe, 
2006), and again in 2009 with the outbreak of H1N1 influenza.  
 
While geographers, including Roger Keil in collaboration with Harris Ali, have 
explored the implications of globalisation on international biosecurity, especially as it 
relates to SARS (Ali and Keil, 2006, 2008; Keil and Ali, 2007), much of the 
contemporary literature focuses on the ways in which national governments and 
international organizations like the WHO have sought, and are seeking, to strengthen 
their international borders against what are regarded as the ‘wrong’ sorts of human 
mobility. Indeed, though the link between public health and international relations - 
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and here we would include all aspects of border control - is not a new one, with many 
countries responding to the threats from cross-border diseases since at least the 
fourteenth century, it is only in the last decade or so that it has (re)emerged as a key 
geopolitical concern (Fidler, 2004a). For Fidler, as for others (including Garrett, 1995; 
King, 2002), this is because national governments, especially those of advanced 
industrial economies, have come to recognise that one of the ‘costs’ of globalisation is 
the “growing threat of the microbial world” (2004a: 4).    
 
This latter point is taken up by Alan Ingram (2005: 532) who, in an essay in which he 
discusses the ‘new’ geopolitics of disease, explains that globalisation has come to be 
associated, at least in the context of global health debate, with the dissolution of 
“epidemiological space”, with the reframing of sovereign power over national 
borders, and with increasing health insecurity (see also Sparke, 2009). One aspect that 
Ingram flags up for particular attention in his analysis is the suggestion that the forms 
of global health governance that have emerged to promote health security reflect a 
shift from Westphalian to post-Westphalian approaches. As Fidler, a key proponent of 
this argument, suggests, during the period between the emergence of international 
public health directives in the 1850s and the end of World War Two the question of 
disease control, in Europe at least, was regarded as the concern of individual 
sovereign nations who remained free of external intervention in their domestic affairs; 
that is, it was conducted on ‘classic’ Westphalian principles (see Fidler 2004abc, 
2007).  
 
The shift away from a Westphalian system to a post-Westphalian regime of global 
health in the post-world war era is centred on the idea that the existing horizontal 
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regime, one “that sought to regulate cross-border microbial traffic” (Fidler, 2004a: 8), 
was replaced by a vertical, rights-based approach. Here, individual rights to health, as 
defined in the WHO constitution (WHO, 1948), and national interests were seen to be 
interdependent and international strategies designed to promote health and prevent 
disease within sovereign nations, such as the WHO’s smallpox eradication campaign 
and its ‘Health for All’ strategy, were developed. More recent events, including the 
global response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the 2003 SARS epidemic might, 
according to Fidler, be interpreted as further illustrations of a shift away from a 
Westphalian rationality, as the desire to contain both epidemics was/is framed by state 
and non-state interests alike (Fidler 2004ab). Although we concur largely with Ingram 
in his positive appraisal of Fidler’s “innovative and sustained analysis” of this shift, 
the question of whether or not the international response to the many and varied 
challenges to global health security are seen in Westphalian, post-Westphalian, or 
indeed other, perhaps imperial, terms, remains.  
 
As Zylberman (2006) notes, our understanding of the relationship between 
globalisation and the search for international/global health security - of the multiple 
and varied actors involved, of the technological devices and public health strategies 
drawn upon to protect and strengthen borders against the agents of disease, and of the 
geopolitical rationalities that help to shape such international endeavour - should not 
be reduced to the “rise and fall of Westphalian public health governance”. This is, as 
he quite rightly states, “only part of the full story” (2006: 35). This point is underlined 
by the medical historian Alison Bashford who notes that, in addition to an 
understanding of the historical geography of disease, an analysis of global health 
governance requires an exploration of the geopolitics of disease management (2006a: 
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1). Put differently, she argues that such an analysis should focus on the measures of 
disease prevention, reduction, and eradication that are implemented and, more 
importantly here, their spatial implications.  
 
A further point of interest is Bashford’s recognition that the interaction between 
infectious disease management and geopolitics is one that involves borders: “the 
politics of disease control concerns the governance of this side and crucially that side, 
of the border” (2006a: 2. Emphasis in original). In highlighting the centrality of 
borders to disease management, and to global health governance more broadly, 
Bashford alludes to the notion that public health intervention occurred outside of the 
jurisdiction of a sovereign state in the period that Fidler categorises in Westphalian 
terms. There are many examples of this, and Bashford refers us to, amongst others, 
European intervention in the former Ottoman Empire and to US public health 
campaigns in Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico. One reason for our raising this here is 
that Bashford highlights further the limitations of analyses of global health 
governance that are limited to a Westphalian/post-Westphalian framework. Further, 
she points researchers in the direction of what we might refer to as a ‘bio-geopolitics’ 
of global health governance; a term which reflects the interweaving of bio-political 
forms of power and geopolitics.        
 
 It is with this in mind that we examine the rapid development of long-haul air travel 
during the twentieth century, the bio-geopolitical challenges posed by this 
development, and the extent to which the political responses demonstrated a shift 
away from a Westphalian towards a post-Westphalian regime. We do so because, 
from its inception, aviation presented a new and challenging set of public health 
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concerns. As we go on to demonstrate, Western nations, in particular, responded with 
a series of sanitary directives that variously framed certain destinations as being host 
to an array of ‘exotic’ or ‘tropical’ diseases that represented a threat to health and 
economic development. These directives prescribed a range of interventions, 
including quarantine and vaccination certificates, which aimed to secure western 
nations and their citizens from certain microbial threats. At times, however, this desire 
to provide ontological and material security created geopolitical tensions between 
those who thought that all possible measures should be taken to safeguard ‘global’, 
though perhaps we should read ‘national’, public health and those who resented the 
idea that aviation’s continued development should be hindered by expensive and 
time-consuming health checks. As the concern surrounding the H5N1 strain of avian 
influenza (Nerlich and Halliday, 2007; HPA, 2007) and, more recently, the H1N1 
strain, have demonstrated, the trade-offs between screening air passengers at airports 
and the socio-economic costs associated with implementing such practices remain 
largely unresolved.  
 
In the analysis that follows, we draw on medical and historical aviation material (the 
latter sourced from Flight International’s digitised online archive and documents 
deposited in the Transport History Collection at the University of Leicester) to map 
some of the processes through which the smooth spaces of the air(ways) became 
increasingly striated as the global airline network developed and highlight the 
growing anxiety that emerged as public health officials and others began to recognise 
some of the health-related implications of an increasingly interconnected aeromobile 
world. We then explore the gradual, and often contested, development of international 
sanitary conventions for aviation that emerged in response to this anxiety and offer a 
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bio-geopolitical interpretation of their significance, noting that the international 
regulatory frameworks that emerged not only sought to manage competing 
geopolitical interests but also to manage the threat of infection from a range of so-
called ‘exotic’ diseases. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ways in which 
our analysis informs, and is informed by, recent debate on the broader geopolitical 
rationality described by Fidler as a shift towards a post-Westphalian global health 
regime and by others as a, perhaps, more nuanced situation in which western nations 
sought to secure the health of their populations through a complex array of bio-
geopolitical strategies.  
 
WINGS AROUND THE WORLD: AVIATION AND NEW GLOBAL HEALTH 
CONCERNS 
 
As a direct consequence of the metaphorical ‘shrinking’ of the globe by aircraft 
during the 1920s and 1930s, nations that had long considered themselves reasonably 
immune to the diseases of foreign nations, in part due to the security afforded to them 
by a combination of time and space, found themselves under increased threat. For 
Australia, the United States, and many of the countries of Western Europe, the time-
space compression associated with air travel rendered existing epidemiological 
surveillance networks almost redundant (Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2006). The 
accelerated compression of time and space that aircraft effected meant that, “A man 
[sic] might fly thousands of miles while incubating a disease, pass medical officials at 
the destination airport, emerge into a new land, and, a day or two later, go down with 
an infectious disease that he had picked up on the other side of the world” (Stuart and 
Baird, 1954: 108-109). Despite this risk, pioneering European air transport companies 
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were encouraged to extend the scope of their passenger operations and to link up 
territories that were scattered across the globe (Sampson, 1984).  
 
At this time, aviation was considered a powerful tool through which European nations 
could establish their authority and exert their influence over foreign nations. In the 
British context, this is reflected in the assumption of responsibility for the Cairo-
Baghdad airmail route by Imperial Airways in 1927 and the subsequent, and quite 
rapid, expansion east; first to Karachi, Jodhpur and Delhi in British India in 1929, 
then to Calcutta, Rangoon and Singapore in 1933, before finally reaching Hong Kong 
and Australia in 1934 (Davies, 1964). However, the limited speed, range, and 
technological capabilities of the early propeller-driven aircraft meant that services 
could only operate during daylight hours and pilots had to make frequent stops to 
refuel the aircraft and allow passengers and crew time to rest. By 1934, the 8458-mile 
Imperial Airways’ flight from London to Singapore was achieved in eight days 
courtesy of intermediate stops at Paris, Brindisi, Athens, Alexandra, Cairo, Gaza, 
Baghdad, Basra, Kuwait, Bahrain, Sharjah, Gwadar, Karachi, Jodhpur, Delhi, 
Cawnpore, Allahabad, Calcutta, Akgats, Rangoon, Bangkok, and Alor Star (see 
Sampson, 1984). 
 
Crucially, however, it was not merely the geographical scope of the early airline 
networks that was significant, but the reduction in total journey times that aircraft 
effected. As an editorial in ‘Flight’ magazine, a publication designed to disseminate 
news of aeronautical achievement to the British public, cautioned as early as 1920, 
“Now an aeroplane can cross the Mediterranean from Europe to the African Continent 
in a night… it would be foolish to ignore the possibility of… pests being introduced 
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into countries hitherto immune by means of the aeroplane… [as]…up to the present 
time these tropical and Eastern insects and pests had perished before they reached 
Europe, because the “carriers” had taken days and weeks in a journey” (Flight, 1920a: 
454). Though slow by modern standards, the speeds attained by early passenger 
aircraft revolutionised notions of time and distance: journeys that had once taken 
weeks or months by surface transport could now be accomplished in a matter of days 
(Table 1).  
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
 
As a consequence of this rapid time-space compression (see Janelle, 1969; Simonsen, 
2005), many parts of the world could now be reached by air within the incubation 
period of major infectious diseases (Table 2). The rapid expansion and intensification 
of global air routes in the early 1930s, and the concomitant rise in passengers and (to 
a lesser extent) freight volumes worldwide, caused considerable concern among 
public health authorities (Megonnell and Chapman, 1956). “Nowadays”, wrote Air 
Commodore H E Whittingham in 1938, “air-travel is so rapid that an aeroplane 
departing from the yellow-fever zones of West Africa reaches the Sudan in two days, 
Mozambique in four days, Durban in five days and, by another route, Karachi in five, 
Calcutta in six… There is, therefore, great danger of yellow fever being spread by air-
passengers incubating the disease or by infected mosquitoes in the aircraft, unless 
special precautions are taken” (1938: 461-462). 
 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
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As the air routes grew, and new airfields were added to the network, the potential for 
insects, small reptiles, and mammals to stow away in aircraft and be transported to the 
next port of call increased. This problem was particularly acute in equatorial Africa, 
where it was noted that all manner of harmful insects were endemic (Handover, 
1936).  
 
Rising appreciation of the increased international mobility of disease and the 
logistical difficulties associated with maintaining surveillance over rising numbers of 
passengers resulted in the formation of specific national public health regulations 
governing aviation. As a direct response to the first flight between England and 
Australia in 1919, Australia became the first country in the world to apply a 
quarantine code to aircraft by defining a “vessel” as “any ship, boat, or other 
description of vessel or vehicle used in navigation by sea or air” (cited in CMAJ, 
1933: 307; see also Flight, 1920d; Bashford, 2004). A similar definition was adopted 
by the United States and, in November that year, the US Government decreed that all 
aircraft entering the country were subject to the same quarantine restrictions as ocean-
going ships (Flight, 1920e).  
 
Clearly, the development of long-haul commercial air travel had highlighted the 
threats posed to and by an increasingly ‘global’ community. As the anxiety 
surrounding the possibility that aircraft could spread noxious agents around the world 
became progressively more acute as new destinations were added to the aerial 
network and passenger numbers increased, international measures were added to these 
national directives. The Office International d’hygiène publique (or the ‘Paris Office’ 
as it was also known), one of two European-based international health agencies 
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established in the early 1900s (see Dorolle, 1968; Bashford, 2006b; Brown et al., 
2006), drafted a precautionary programme of measures that were designed to prevent 
the spread of yellow fever by air because “while it has been shown that the carrying of 
adult mosquitoes on [maritime] vessels is not the danger it was once supposed to be, 
nothing is known of airplane conditions, and there is a rather general belief that a real 
danger exists” (AJPH, 1930: 1221).  
 
While the prevalence of insects naturally varied with the geographical site and 
situation of individual landing grounds, research at Kisumu in Kenya in the early 
1930s found that almost half of all aircraft arriving from the north harboured insects 
despite the eradication measures that were undertaken at intermediate aerodromes to 
try and prevent their spread (Whittingham, 1938). In response, local health authorities 
along the route to Durban attempted to restrict the movement of insects by hanging 
curtains impregnated with paradichlorbenzine, a pungent agent usually used to deter 
moths, over the doorway of aircraft, placing powerful air blowers by aircraft doors to 
try and prevent insects from flying in, and physically inspecting aircraft, passengers, 
and cargo for signs of infestation (ibid., 1938: 463). However, no method proved 
infallible and stowaways were invariably transported (Flight 1920b). 
 
Such interventions created a tension between those who thought all available means 
should be employed to prevent the spread of infectious disease by air, and those who 
thought the procedures were too restrictive and unduly hindered the continued 
development of commercial aviation. One aviation commentator wrote at the time that 
while “the Colorado Beetle is known to travel by road and rail, the tsetse fly has lived 
in a sleeping car through Central Africa, and the cockroach first went to the East in a 
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ship, [and] there would seem to be a possibility of the movement of similar “beasties” 
by air…nothing has eventuated” and observed that the “innocuous” house fly “seems 
at present to be the only insect that travels unasked on an Imperial Air Route” (Salt, 
1930: 220). Nevertheless, despite Salt’s apparent lack of concern, the first tentative 
steps towards the internationalisation of sanitary measures for aviation were taken at 
the thirteenth International Sanitary Conference in Paris in 1926 (Massey, 1933). 
Here, it was formally agreed that a period of five days should be universally accepted 
as the infective period of yellow fever and a compulsory period of observation of six 
days before embarkation and a further period six days observation upon arrival was 
imposed in the subsequent Sanitary Convention on all passengers flying from an 
infected area (AJPH, 1930: 1221).  
 
THE FORMATION OF AND CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL SANITARY 
MEASURES FOR AVIATION 
 
It is well established that the geopolitics of disease prevention operates through, and is 
linked with, the policing of sovereign territory and that the inspection of people, their 
bodies, identities, and the documents that they carry make “borders more than abstract 
lines on maps, but a set of practices on the ground.” (Bashford, 2006a: 7). Though a 
system of maritime quarantine had been practised since the fourteenth century and 
was widely regarded as an essential tool in safeguarding public health (see Fidler 
2001), it was apparent by the mid-nineteenth century that a more extensive 
‘international’ public health framework was required (Harrison, 2006). Within 
Europe, the desire to internationalise the public health effort was in part linked to the 
growing realisation that developments in transport and communication systems and 
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the steady growth of transnational flows, especially between European nations and 
their colonial territories, left the continent vulnerable to the spread of infectious 
diseases. As many commentators have observed, this vulnerability was especially 
associated with Europe’s eastern borders and the apparent ease with which diseases 
including cholera and plague were able to cross into the West (see Harrison, 2006; 
Huber, 2006; Zylberman, 2006). 
 
The beginnings of such a framework emerged through a series of ‘international’ 
health conferences, the first of which convened in Paris in 1851 (Harrison, 2006). 
Though the first of these Sanitary Conferences is often regarded as a failure, in part 
because only three of the twelve nations that attended actually signed the resulting 
convention, subsequent conferences nevertheless represented early attempts to 
promote health and prevent the spread of disease through pre-emptive activity both at, 
and beyond, the border (Bashford, 2006a). More significantly, in the context of this 
paper, delegates were required to find a solution to a complex geopolitical problem: 
namely, how to accommodate the liberalisation of international trade and commerce 
whilst simultaneously containing threats associated with increased transnational flows 
of goods and people. As Huber (2006) notes in her detailed analysis of these 
conferences, for many delegates the solution lay beyond traditional public health 
practices, such as the imposition of relatively inflexible quarantine or cordons 
sanitaires, as these were considered an “intolerable hindrance to international 
communications and commerce” (Howard-Jones, 1950: 1034).   
 
Ultimately, the model of international public health that was proposed and partially 
implemented did not involve direct intervention in the domestic health of other 
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nations. That is, the aim of the various conferences was not to improve the health of 
those living in countries where diseases such as cholera, plague and yellow fever were 
endemic. Rather, what was put in place was a series of public health initiatives that 
sought to distinguish between different types of cross-border enterprise and were 
sensitive to developments in international communication and transport networks. 
With regards the former, there was a clear targeting of those ‘enterprises’ that 
emanated from the ‘East’. Zylberman’s analysis of the International Sanitary 
Conferences and the response of the European delegations to the threat of cholera, 
particularly after the 1865 epidemic and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, are 
particularly germane here (see also Huber, 2006). As she reveals, political and health-
related anxiety, especially surrounding the annual Hajj to Mecca, resulted in a 10-day 
quarantine period being established for the three main pestilential diseases after the 
1866 Sanitary Conference in Constantinople. While certain vessels were exempt from 
such measures, the reality for pilgrims travelling to Mecca along the main sea-routes 
was that they experienced much longer stays in what Zylberman describes as a 
“militarized zone” (2006: 25).  
 
Of particular relevance here is the fact that such measures were refined as 
communication systems became more sophisticated and as transport networks became 
more advanced. By the time of the 1892 International Sanitary Conference in Venice, 
delegates were able to agree upon, and subsequently implement, a surveillance system 
that used telegram communications with ships travelling through the Suez Canal to 
determine their relative risk. Those ships that carried doctors and appropriate 
disinfection equipment were allowed to pass unimpeded, those that did not (or 
contained pilgrims heading for Mecca) were subject to inspection and observation 
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(Huber, 2006). Another, perhaps even more pertinent example came about as a result 
of the Dresden Sanitary Conference of 1893. Here, delegates recognised that an 
expanded rail network posed new problems and were forced to consider whether 
public health inspections, and any resulting isolation measures, should occur at the 
point of departure or arrival. As Huber notes, the debate “bore significant parallels to 
that on passage through the Suez Canal: both were addressing the fact that technology 
had changed the way in which space was traversed” (2006: 468).  
 
The significance of the International Sanitary Conferences, of which 14 were held 
between 1851 and 1938, is subject to some debate, especially given the failure of 
some participating nations to ratify many of the conventions that were proposed. As 
the Editor of the British Medical Journal remarked (1949: 23), the conventions “may 
have been impeccable on the diplomatic level but were often sadly ineffective on the 
practical level”. Though this may be the case, the conferences did represent an early 
attempt to establish a modern ‘international’ public health mechanism for dealing 
with epidemics of infectious diseases in an age of increased trade and mobility, 
though the conventions designed to tackle threats posed by maritime and rail travel 
required further consideration before they could deal with the unique challenges 
presented by commercial aviation (Stock, 1945).  
 
Interestingly, the first multilateral public health agreement to deal expressly with air 
travel did not come from Europe but from a parallel body, the International Sanitary 
Bureau, that was established in Washington D.C. in 1902 (García et al., 1999). 
Following discussion at the (by then re-named) Pan American Sanitary Conference of 
November 1924, 18 countries in North, Central, and South America signed a Code 
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which called for the “prevention of the international spread of communicable 
infection of human beings” and, in the event such infections should occur, the 
adoption of cooperative measures to prevent “the introduction and spread of disease” 
into other territories that were hitherto unaffected by all means, including the air 
(cited in García et al., 1999: 28; see also Cheng, 1962).  
 
However, the first truly international, as opposed to regional, public health convention 
concerned with air travel was the Congress on Sanitary Aviation, which was held in 
Paris in May 1929 and attended by the representatives of 38 countries (Flight, 1930). 
Six resolutions detailing the extension of sanitary aviation and obligations concerning 
government assistance were passed (idem). Four years later, in April 1933, the First 
International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation was convened in The Hague 
where the Paris Office and the International Commission for Air Navigation prepared 
an agreement that provided for the first international sanitary control of aerial 
navigation (Massey, 1933). The resulting Convention, which became effective in 
August 1935, contained 67 Articles and dealt with threats posed by Typhus, 
Smallpox, Plague, Cholera, and Yellow Fever. Medical inspection and control of 
tropical disease were discussed, and detailed methods of eradicating the vector of 
Yellow Fever, the Aëdes aegypti mosquito, were proposed. The Convention also 
established common international sanitary standards for aircraft and landing grounds 
and provided, amongst other things, for the construction of anti-amaryl aerodromes, 
the control and/or isolation of air passengers in endemic yellow fever areas, 
preventative inoculation, and the destruction of insects in aircraft and around 
aerodromes (Whittingham, 1938).  
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Significantly, Britain and France, as leading members of the Paris Office, were torn 
between such hygienic concerns for their populace and the commercial interests of 
their fledgling airline industries. One of the most contentious issues concerned the 
treatment of aircraft arriving from endemic disease areas, and opinion polarised 
between those who favoured stringent regulation and those who did not wish to 
disrupt air traffic by enforcing time-consuming and expensive disease-control 
measures (Bell, 1997). This resulted in different interpretations and inconsistent 
enforcement of the regulations. Some countries demanded that additional disease 
control measures, above and beyond those stipulated by the international community, 
be practised at their frontiers. For example, in the late 1930s, India and the Dutch East 
Indies prohibited any aircraft from landing that was flying “from areas which can be 
considered endemic” (Bell, 1997: 169), while the Nigerian health authorities 
demanded all air passengers provide a week’s notice of their proposed departure date 
and travel itinerary so a decision could be taken on whether to quarantine them prior 
to departure (Whittingham, 1938). Elsewhere, the Egyptian and Sudanese health 
authorities required services between Europe and Africa to change aircraft in 
Alexandria and Khartoum respectively to lessen the risk of disease vectors being 
directly transported into their territory (Flight, 1935), while other nations obliged 
passengers to possess health certificates confirming inoculation against various 
diseases (Imperial Airways, 1939).  
 
While some of these additional measures can be interpreted as an expression of 
national autonomy over their borders, some practices, including disinsection (the 
eradication of insects inside an aircraft using chemical insecticides), had a basis in 
international aeronautical law and were, theoretically, to be universally applied. 
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Airlines had first attempted to address the problems of insects, especially the malaria-
carrying anopheles mosquito, ‘hitching rides’ in equatorial regions in the late 1920s 
with hand-held insect sprays, but difficulties regarding the type of insecticide that 
should be used and the most effective method of delivery took several years to 
resolve. The legal basis for eradicating insects and other stowaways in aircraft, or 
‘disinsection’ as it was termed, through the application of pesticides and insecticides, 
was enshrined in Article 5(e) of the 1933 Sanitary Convention. This Article stipulated 
that all sanitary aerodromes must have the “apparatus necessary for carrying out 
disinfection, disinsectisation [sic] and deratisation [sic]” of aircraft in order to prevent 
the spread of disease. However, early experiments with Flit guns, ‘Freon bombs’, and 
hand-held aerosols had found them to be largely ineffective as the spray they 
produced was neither sufficiently fine nor suitably penetrating, while the larger 
electrical and petrol-driven pressure sprayers that were employed at aerodromes were 
too heavy and bulky to be used in-flight (Whittingham, 1938; Flight, 1947). Other 
proposals, including pumping insecticide through special ducts built into the aircraft 
fuselage were similarly rejected on grounds of weight and cost (Whittingham, 1938) 
and signatories to the 1933 Convention merely agreed that disinsection should involve 
the application of “some form of aerial spray containing a rapidly acting insecticide” 
during flight (Flight, 1947: 95). 
 
Under the direction of their medical adviser, Imperial Airways’ Experimental 
Production section devised a new, more effective, system of disinsection. Constructed 
from lightweight metal and powered by electricity, the Phantomyst Electrical 
Disseminator or Phantomyst Vaporiser discharged a fine, dry, near odourless cloud of 
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Pyrethrum-based insecticide into the passenger cabin (Mackie and Crabtree 1938; 
Flight 1938a). It was reported that the device leaves:  
 
“no unpleasant odour and [has] no harmful effects on people, clothing or 
upholstery. Being non-inflammable it may be used in aeroplanes and it is 
through to be the answer to the yellow fever mosquito and other licentious 
lice, which attempt to stowaway on aeroplanes in the tropics and spread 
their doctrines in places hitherto immune” (Flight, 1938b: 327).  
 
During the Second World War, the work of the Paris Office was disrupted and its 
functions, including those under the 1933 Hague Convention, were temporarily 
entrusted to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). 
In anticipation of the rapid post-war growth of civilian aviation, and in light of new 
epidemiological conditions, scientific innovations, and enhanced medical knowledge, 
it was decided that the existing 1933 International Sanitary Convention for Aerial 
Navigation was outdated and required modification. A revised document, which 
called for “special measures to prevent the spread by air across frontiers of epidemic 
or other communicable diseases”, was opened for signature at Washington in 
December 1944 and was ratified by 14 countries including the United States and the 
United Kingdom (United Nations Treaty Series 106 1948: 250). The modified 
Convention introduced new documentation, in the form of aircraft and passenger 
health declarations, international certificates of inoculation against Cholera, Yellow 
Fever, Typhus Fever and Smallpox, and certificates of immunity against Yellow 
Fever. Yet while it was believed that “the spread of disease can be held in check only 
by a scheme which is internationally sponsored and internationally controlled” 
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(Flight, 1947: 95), the regulations were not uniform in statute or enforcement and the 
inability to practise global surveillance undermined their effectiveness (Davey, 1948). 
 
As a consequence of the 1944 revisions, the health regulations for air travel became 
increasingly complex. Not only did the number of required inoculations now depend 
both on the route that was to be flown, responsibility for complying with the 
regulations of each country (many of which were contradictory or mutually exclusive) 
was transferred to individual passengers (Barrett, 1947: 1949). Variations in the 
validity of immunization certificates, with regards to dates of commencement and 
cessation (and even the dosage, type, and manufacturer of the serum that could be 
used), were another source of confusion (Kyle, 1948). For the smallpox vaccine alone, 
validity varied from a minimum of 12 days to 1 year after vaccination in Thailand to 
21 days/2 years in Egypt, even though the international standard was nominally set at 
14 days/3 years (idem). One possible explanation for these variations was that the 
adoption of universal standards would require the partial abrogation of sovereignty on 
behalf of the individual countries concerned as “the sanitary staff engaged in this 
work would be responsible not to local directors of medical services, but to the World 
Health Organization of the United Nations” (Flight, 1947: 95).  
 
Owing to the different medical requirements demanded by individual states, and the 
inconsistencies in their policing, many airlines advised passengers to be inoculated 
against almost every conceivable disease. This situation led to confusion, resentment, 
and excessive inoculation, with one family who wished to fly from Paris to China 
“forced to submit to inoculation against smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, plague, 
typhoid, and paratyphoid” (BMJ, 1949: 23). Moreover, the acquisition of the correct 
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documentation was both time-consuming and expensive. In the UK, only 11 medical 
institutions were authorised to administer the required vaccines and issue the resulting 
certificates (Barrett, 1947), and critics of the scheme argued that “the international 
traveller is increasingly being harassed by demands for certificates of vaccination 
against a lengthening list of diseases… and the various processes now linked with 
such documents constitute a distinct obstacle to the free movement of peoples in 
many parts of the world” (Gear, 1948: 1092).  
 
Questions regarding the suitability of, and reliance upon, personal health certificates 
as evidence of inoculation were also raised. As Gear (1948: 1092) remarked, “there is 
considerable difference between recognizing vaccination… as a reliable procedure 
and acknowledging the obligatory certificate as beyond reproach”. Ironically, the 
authority vested in the very documents that were designed to ensure unfettered access 
to international aeromobility was increasingly being challenged. Writing on the 
British experience, ‘Flight’ magazine remarked that at foreign airports “those who 
examine the certificates are not always provided with specimens of the various types, 
or with a list of the medical officers empowered to sign such certificates” and thus “it 
is not surprising to learn that they have, in the past, been forged, and that it is 
reported…that on the Continent there is a black market with a recognized tariff for 
these certificates” (Flight, 1947: 95). It was also alleged that some individuals made 
false health declarations to avoid being detained at the airport (Stanley-Turner, 1947). 
A further concern was the suggestion that travellers may be tempted to bribe health 
officials to bypass health checks. To counter this temptation, passengers were warned, 
as early as 1924, that they could face a £200 fine for deliberately withholding 
information from health officials (Imperial Airways, 1924). Nevertheless, evidence 
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suggests that those with sufficient money and political influence could (and did) buy 
their way around the regulations (Cobham, 1978: 131).  
 
Despite sustained attempts to create a universal public health response to the disease 
threats air travel posed, many countries refused to ratify either Sanitary Convention. 
Only nine nations ratified both Conventions, 16 remained bound by the 1933 
convention only and a further nine only ratified the 1944 convention, leaving 36 
States not bound by either. As the editor of the British Medical Journal noted with 
alarm, “since many countries are bound by no particular convention they are free to 
take the law into their own hands. Some countries refuse to trouble themselves and 
take few if any precautions, others… have rushed to the other extreme and imposed 
restrictions which go far in excess of what is required” (BMJ, 1949: 22). Some 
countries, including the United States, practised highly protectionist policies with 
respect to foreign quarantine (see AJPH 1952), while others relied on outmoded 
practices of frontier disease control that were not consistent at all airports (Megonnell 
and Chapman 1956). 
 
In recognition that the international regulations concerning quarantine and disease 
control were in a state of confusion, a global directive aimed at controlling the spread 
of diseases by air was enshrined in Chapter II, Article 14, of the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on International Aviation, which stipulated that: 
 
“Each contracting State agrees to take effective measures to prevent the 
spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus (epidemic), smallpox, 
yellow fever, plague, and other communicable diseases as the contracting 
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States shall from time to time decide to designate, and to that end 
contracting States will keep in close consultation with the agencies 
concerned with international regulations relating to sanitary measure 
applicable to aircraft” (ICAO 1944). 
 
However, in addition to safeguarding global public health, individual states were also 
responsible, under Chapter IV, Article 22, to ensure that “the administration of the 
laws relating to immigration, quarantine, customs, and clearance” does not result in 
“unnecessary delays to aircraft, crews, passengers, and cargo” (ICAO 1944). States 
were thus caught between international obligations to enforce new sanitary 
regulations and a requirement to avoid unnecessary delays.  
 
Further steps towards the internationalisation of public health measures for aviation 
occurred on July 22nd 1946, when the constitution of the World Health Organisation 
was signed in New York. The first assembly of the WHO subsequently convened in 
Geneva in June 1948 and established an Expert Committee on International 
Epidemiology and Quarantine with the instruction “to revise the existing International 
Sanitary Conventions…and combine them into a single body of regulations covering 
the needs of all travellers”. The resulting new regulations were based on a number of 
principles, including the request that individual member states develop their own 
internal protection against disease through improvements in sanitation, the control of 
insect vectors, and national immunisation programmes. Significantly, it was also 
decreed that the public health measures that could be adopted at national frontiers 
should be the minimum compatible with the existing sanitary situation, as excessive 
measures would not only interfere with the flow of (air) traffic and have serious 
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economic repercussions, but also, by their very excess, “lead to deliberate evasion of 
the sanitary control” (Cheng, 1962: 155).  
 
In essence, then, such measures reflect what Fidler views as a shift from Westphalian 
to post-Westphalian public health: after all, member states were required to take 
measures that would not only control the spread of infectious diseases between 
sovereign territory but also prevent the emergence of such diseases in the first place. 
Yet, as we imply in the opening to this paper, such a reading overlooks the limited 
power that institutions like the WHO had (and arguably continue to have) in affecting 
change within nation states and also the tensions that continued to arise between 
individual sovereign powers in matters of infectious disease management (Davies, 
2008). An example of this can be found in the tension that arose, albeit before the new 
regulations were in place, between Britain and India when it was alleged that practices 
of infection control had taken on a political as well as a biological dimension. More 
specifically, in response to Britain’s routine disinsection of aircraft arriving from 
India, the soon to be independent Indian government decided in 1946 that all aircraft 
arriving in their country from Britain must be similarly treated (Barrett, 1947). 
Encapsulated in this ‘tit for tat’ response is what we might regard as the ‘bio-
geopolitics’ associated with the materialization of an international public health 
framework for aviation. In the final section of this paper, we offer a critical reading of 
this emergence.  
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DISCUSSION  
 
“We have reached the stage when we no longer think of countries overseas 
as being separated by distance, but by time… That is to say that countries 
where all sorts of unfamiliar diseases flourish are nearer to this country in 
point of time than the length of their incubation periods” (cited in Stanley-
Turner, 1947: 838). 
 
Notions of time and space are crucial to our understanding of the shifting public 
health response to an increasingly fluid, mobile, and inter-connected society. 
Referring to Foucauldian-inspired scholarship, Alison Bashford (2004) points, albeit a 
little sceptically, to the abandonment of crude public health responses to outbreaks of 
infectious disease in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries by many 
Western governments. Here, Foucault’s (1977) conceptualisation of a ‘plague town’, 
which was defined by the practice of imposing cordons sanitaires and concomitant 
notions of isolation and confinement, was gradually replaced as technological 
improvements in transport and communications rendered them increasingly 
ineffective. Developments in shipping, rail travel and, later, aviation, were 
particularly important in this regard, as they were instrumental in the metaphorical 
shrinking of space by time. 
 
Clearly, the twentieth century development of air travel had a specific and a profound 
impact on global public health governance. The technology of the aeroplane, and most 
notably the speed of travel, has, over the past century, seen ‘new’ disease threats 
emerge and ‘old’ ones appear ever more frightening, in the West at least. As we note 
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in this paper, the realisation that national borders were no longer, if indeed they ever 
were, ‘secure’, was highly significant since borders act(ed) both to define the 
boundaries of a nation and demarcate its lines of quarantine, for it is often at the 
border where human and non-human bodies and other potentially dangerous ‘vessels’ 
are monitored, surveyed, and perhaps excluded. However, as Bashford rightly 
observes, “borders aim to regulate and control movement, flow and exchange, not 
stop it all together” (2004: 124). This was a key issue for those trying to establish a 
public health framework that could respond to the challenges that followed from the 
emergence of commercial air travel. Of particular concern was how to regulate an 
increasingly (aero)mobile society while simultaneously accommodating the demand 
for more liberalised global travel. 
 
Whilst individual countries had instigated their own sanitary procedures by the early 
1920s, the first international attempts to bring the public health impacts of aviation 
under unified control did not occur until the early 1930s. The 1933 Sanitary 
Convention on Aerial Navigation established the principles and standards on which 
(inter)national public health measures should be based and, as we reveal above, 
involved practices that were targeted at both human passengers and at the non-human 
cargoes that were transported by air. Importantly, the 1933 convention sought to 
overcome the problem of where such micro-practices of public health should occur. 
As with other modes of transport, most notably rail travel, the issue was whether 
public health surveillance should be implemented on departure or arrival; that is at or 
beyond the sovereign borders of a nation. As we note, one solution was to pass some 
of the responsibility for implementing public health measures on to the airlines and 
their passengers. After all, it was the commercial airlines that were required to carry 
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out disinsection, and it was the passengers who were responsible for ensuring that 
they carried valid documentation detailing the inoculations they had received prior to 
travel. However, the effectiveness of this system was undermined both by individual 
passengers and national governments who, frustrated that a supposedly rapid mode of 
international transport was being hindered by public health bureaucracy, chose to 
ignore or deliberately circumvent the regulations.  
 
In subsequent decades, the limitations of existing systems of public health regulation 
became increasingly apparent. The invention of the jet engine, combined with 
continued innovations in aerodynamics and material sciences, enabled aircraft to fly 
further, faster, longer, and higher than ever before, revolutionising understandings of 
travel time and distance and increasing the need for vigilance: “In a world in which 
carriers of disease can spread with the speed of an aeroplane. A typhus louse or a 
plague flea, brushed off the rags of a beggar in an Eastern bazaar, can be in Tokyo or 
Oslo, New York or Moscow, London or Sydney, within a few hours” (Brockington, 
1958: 217). In response to such threats, delegates at the Fourth World Health 
Assembly of May 1951 unanimously adopted a new set of International Sanitary 
Regulations (Cheng, 1962). According to these regulations, passengers embarking on 
an international flight to certain destinations had to be in possession of valid 
immunization certificates as prescribed by the World Health Organisation (not just the 
receiving country concerned) and rules regarding the mobility of non-human cargoes 
were also strengthened (Whittingham, 1953: Flight, 1951).  
 
Additional sanitary regulations for aviation were adopted at subsequent meetings of 
the World Health Assembly, and the International Sanitary Regulations of 1951 
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(which were subsequently renamed the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 
1969 and further modified in 1973 and 1981), remained the only global regulations 
for the control of infectious diseases during the remainder of the twentieth century 
(Gostin, 2004). The IHR aimed to “ensure the maximum security against the 
international spread of disease with a minimum interference with world traffic” and, 
to this end, required countries to notify the WHO of any case of cholera, plague or 
yellow fever that occurred within their territory and adopt universal hygiene measures 
at ports, airports and other frontier posts (Gostin, 2004: 2624). While individual 
countries could request personal health and vaccination certificates from travellers in 
respect of these three diseases, the health measures the IHR permitted were the 
maximum measures a State may take for the protection of its territory (ibid. 2003). 
However, the narrow scope of the IHR meant the regulations were not only irrelevant 
for confronting known international public health threats such as HIV/AIDS and 
hepatitis, but were also non-responsive to the emergence of new infectious diseases 
such as SARS (Ashraf, 1999). In recognition of the IHR’s limitations, a revised draft, 
which provided for increased surveillance, flexibility, and the global coordination of 
disease responses, was approved and adopted by member states in May 2005. 
 
Nevertheless, continued difficulties regarding IHR compliance continue to pose 
significant challenges for global public health governance. Individual countries may 
choose to ignore international law on grounds of sovereignty, economic self-interest, 
or because they are incapable of complying due to war, natural disaster, or a lack of 
resources. As Gostin (2004: 2626) notes, it may even be in a country’s interest to 
overlook WHO regulations in certain situations as compliance “may risk national 
prestige, travel, trade, and tourism” and thus “reporting a disease outbreak… and 
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offering full cooperation may incur serious economic harm by impeding the flow of 
people and goods”. Clearly, the commercial airline industry continues to present a 
number of challenges to (inter)national systems of public health and, as we have 
shown, it is both issues of time and space and power and efficacy that lie at the heart 
of them. 
 
The conceptualisation of a shift in global health governance informs our reading of 
the emergence of a new international (later global) regulatory regime for commercial 
aviation in several key ways. On one level, the idea of a shift is useful because we can 
find some clear evidence of a Westphalian system in practice during the early years of 
the commercial aviation industry. Indeed, up until the mid-twentieth century, the 
regulatory ideas concerning the socio-political geographies of aviation, health and 
governance were emerging within a context in which the European (and here we 
might add the American and Australian) body/nation was perceived to be threatened 
by contact with foreign ‘Others’ (see Farley, 1991; Lyons, 1992; Anderson, 1996; 
Bashford, 2004). Yet, the creation of the WHO in 1946, and the subsequent 
establishment of an expert committee on quarantine in 1948, saw an attempt to 
challenge this Westphalian mentality through the adoption of new international 
sanitary regulations that aimed to counter the need for restrictive (and time 
consuming) national border-controls.  
 
It is here, however, that our reading moves away from Fidler’s. For although we can 
see the traces of what might be regarded as a post-Westphalian regulatory system 
emerging, there is also a clear suggestion that national interests remained at play; 
many of which were, and perhaps still are (see Aginam, 2003), framed by geopolitical 
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tensions that existed between imperial and post-colonial nations. Thus, despite our 
analysis largely focusing on the period leading up to the construction of this new 
regulatory environment in the mid-twentieth century, we argue that it offers important 
insights into the contemporary situation. As Braun (2007) shows with reference to 
SARS and other viruses, contemporary global public health security, even in a post-
Westphalian system, remains a highly geopolitical entity concerned with the 
containment of risk and the protection of international borders from diseases whose 
origins are believed to lie overseas.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A number of key issues are raised by way of conclusion. As regards our methodology, 
by tracing in detail the ‘historical bio-geopolitics’ of passenger aviation, including 
how, when, and why regulations came about, our approach has facilitated a nuanced 
interpretation of the relations between the rise and expansion of aeromobility as the 
normal mode of long-distance international travel during the twentieth century and the 
development of global public health governance. In so doing we have moved beyond 
many existing accounts that merely acknowledge that heightened aeromobility was a 
driver of new international public health regimes.  
 
The paper has also demonstrated how the introduction of various regulatory practices 
during the opening decades of the twentieth century was an important dimension of 
the imperial experience and the exercise of power over others (both at the level of the 
State and the individual). In contrast to many accounts of imperial science and 
colonial medical practice however, we have also shown that this regulatory impulse 
was driven not only by European fears of insects and infectious diseases that were 
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new to western science but, more particularly, by a concern that as a consequence of 
aeromobility, pathogens in other environments were no longer ‘in their place’. 
Furthermore, our analysis challenges an evolutionary perspective in relation to the 
expansion of aeromobility and regimes of control. It has illustrated that, during these 
same early decades of the last century, the impetus to regulate others was 
accompanied by a broader anxiety that the complexity of commercial air travel posed 
threats to an increasingly ‘global’ community, and that national sovereignty must be 
qualified in an effort to manage the movement of transnational pathogens.   
 
At the heart of this anxiety over the exact place in which border control and 
surveillance should take place lies a concern with the enhanced mobility of a range of 
infectious agents and the vectors that help to transport them. Here our paper engages 
with current research which explores notions of biopower and bio-security. Our 
contribution to this particular discussion has been to identify the emergence of an 
international regulatory regime for the international commercial airline industry that 
not only sought to stop the global transfer of non-human disease vectors by the 
performance of disinsection and other similar methods of insect control but also to 
enhance the surveillance and regulation of diseased human agents. In this sense, what 
we highlight are the beginnings of the kind of bio-surveillance regime that Amoore 
refers to her recent discussion of the ‘biometric border’ (2006). For example, the 
introduction of vaccination certificates might usefully be interpreted as portable 
devices that enabled increasingly mobile bodies to be surveilled at either side of a 
border and which acted to govern (but not unduly hinder) the movements of people 
and (by association) the disease agents they might carry.  
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In emphasising the significance of time and space, speed and mobility, to the 
development of this particular aspect of a new regime for global public health 
governance, the paper also raises important questions about the exercise of power and 
the efficacy of supranational decision-making. A recurring theme is the geopolitical 
tensions that emerged between the imperative to safeguard national and global public 
health and commercial concerns that the continued development of aviation should 
not be hindered by supposedly expensive and time-consuming health checks. In 
effect, there were fundamental differences between the demands of an expanding 
airline industry, for which heightened aeromobility offered opportunities for greater 
speed and efficiency of movement, and a regulatory regime of surveillance and 
control that appeared to constrain these opportunities. 
 
It is clear from our evidence that fear can stimulate collective political action and that 
developments in scientific and medical understanding have failed to eliminate a sense 
of global risk and, in some cases, may actually enhance it. Equally our findings 
emphasise the need to distinguish between regulatory standards and practices 
associated with aeronautical technology and those dealing with individual 
(aero)mobile human bodies. Whilst certain elements of the global air transport 
system, such as airport lighting and signage, air traffic control, and safety standards, 
have been amenable to a degree of consistent setting, interpretation and reinforcing of 
regulations by supra-national organisations such as the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) and others, the regulation of humans and their bodies is an 
altogether more complex, politically sensitive and oft-contested process.   
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Table 1: ‘Twice as far in half the time’ – by 1935 flying offered significant reductions 
in journey times, a fact which had serious implications for the spread of disease. 
 
 
London to - 
Time by air (days) Time by surface 
transport (days) 
Time saved by air 
(days) 
Alexandria 2½ 4½ 2 
Calcutta 6½ 16 9½ 
Rangoon 7 19 12 
Singapore 8½ 22 13½ 
Nairobi 5½ 19 13½ 
Johannesburg 8½ 18½ 10 
Cape Town 9 17 8 
Brisbane 12½ 32 19½ 
Source: Derived from Imperial Airways (1935: 8) 
 
 
Table 2: The relationship between the incubation period for selected infectious 
diseases and the journey time between selected endemic zones and the United 
Kingdom, 1938.  
 
Disease Incubation period 
(days) 
Endemic area Journey time by air 
(days) 
Cholera 2-5 India 4-5 
  Iraq 2-3 
    
Plague 2-6 India 4-5 
  Iraq 2-3 
  East Africa 4 
  West Africa 3-5 
  South America 4-5 
    
Smallpox 10-14 India  4-5 
  Iraq 2-3 
    
Typhus  5-12 Central Europe 2 
  Russia 2 
    
Yellow Fever 3-6 West Africa 3-5 
  South America 4-5 
Source: Whittingham (1938: 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
